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ABSTRACT 
 
JENNIFER L. BUXTON: Perestroika Pirouettes and Glasnost Glissés: 
The Kirov and the Bolshoi Ballet, 1977-1991 
(Under direction of Jacqueline M. Olich) 
 
 This paper examines the developments of the Soviet art form of classical ballet during 
the twilight years of the Soviet Union. Throughout the Soviet era, art and politics were 
closely intertwined; the country’s ballet institutions served the government abroad, as 
cultural ambassadors, and at home, as educational representatives. As Gorbachev’s political 
and economic reforms progressed, state funded institutions sought to adapt to the ever-
changing environment.  Through an investigation of the activities of the two preeminent 
ballet theaters in the county, the Bolshoi Ballet in Moscow and the Kirov Ballet in 
Leningrad, this project explores how two cultural institutions navigated the dynamic 
landscape of perestroika and challenges the trope of Brezhnevite stagnation. Through the 
utilization of memoirs, periodicals, and secondary sources, my study illustrates how ballet 
artists in Moscow and Leningrad responded to the changes occurring outside of the theater 
during this time and complicates our perception of the otherwise improvisational nature of 
the Soviet Union’s last years. 
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 On the night of January 17, 2013, a masked assailant attacked Sergei Filin, the artistic 
director of the Bolshoi Ballet, by throwing sulfuric acid in the ballet master’s face.1 The 
horrific attack, which occurred outside of Filin’s home in Moscow, attracted international 
attention and sparked shock and disbelief among many dancers and balletomanes.2 While 
creative disagreements, personal tensions, and artistic rivalries in ballet are universal, much 
of the world is left wondering what could have prompted someone to viciously bring the 
inner battles of the theater onto the streets of Moscow. Many, including the Bolshoi’s general 
director Anatolii Iksanov, believe that Filin was targeted because of his artistic goals and 
plans for the Bolshoi, which encompassed hiring, for the first time in its history, an American 
as a principal dancer3 and acquiring new choreographic works for the company.4 Others, 
including former Bolshoi chief choreographer Aleksei Ratmanskii, were less than surprised 
                                                 
1
 For Russian translations I employ the Library of Congress transliteration system except for well-
known proper names, i.e., Maya Plisetskaya instead of Maiia Plisetskaia and for Russian names 
frequently used in English, i.e., Bolshoi Theater instead of Bol’shoi Theater. 
 
2
 Ellen Barry, “Harsh Light Falls on Bolshoi After Acid Attack,” New York Times, January 18, 2013. 
 
3
 In September 2011, Filin offered David Hallberg, of American Ballet Theater, a permanent position 
at the Bolshoi as a principal dancer, the top rank in a ballet company. Hallberg made his Bolshoi 
debut in November of the same year and continues to honor his obligations to both companies. 
Alastair Macaulay and Daniel Wakin, “American is to Join the Bolshoi Ballet,” New York Times, 
September 20, 2011.  
 
4
 For example, the Bolshoi was set to premiere a new version of The Rite of Spring, by British 
choreographer Wayne McGregor, but the March 2013 performance was postponed due to Filin’s 
health. Olga Svistunova, “Bol’shoi teatr perenes prem’eru balet “Vesna sviashchennaia” do pol’nogo 
vyzdorovleniia Filina,” Itar-Tass, February 1, 2013. 
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by the assault and he expressed an overall disgust with the toxic Bolshoi environment.5 The 
attack on Filin illustrates the extent to which ballet in Russia, especially in the capital’s 
preeminent theater,6 is still in a period of transition, even though more than twenty years 
have elapsed since the demise of the Soviet system. 
 The artistic questions and conflicts at the Bolshoi today can be traced back to the late 
Soviet era, when Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascent to the position of general secretary of the 
Communist Party in 1985 ushered in the era of perestroika, glasnost, and demokratizatsiia. 
Gorbachev’s perestroika, often translated as “economic restructuring,” aimed to liberate the 
Soviet economy from the state, which had previously regulated and directed almost all trade 
activity and industrial production in the country and, in addition, sought to support the 
development of small-scale private enterprise.7 Glasnost, or “openness,” allowed for a new 
level of truthfulness and honesty in the public arena, which promoted a formerly unthinkable 
free dialogue between the state and citizen.8 Initially, Gorbachev viewed demokratizatsiia, or 
democratization, not as a full-blown Western style democracy,9 but favored measures that 
demanded the Party be more accountable to the public. Demokratizatsiia brought electoral 
                                                 
5
 Anna Gordeeva, “Ne streliaite v belykh lebedei. O napadenii na baletnogo khydruka, vynuzhdennoi 
bezhat’ iz strany balerine i zhestkoi real’nosti vozdushnogo isskusstva,” Moskovskie Novosti, January 
24, 2013.  
 
6
 While the use of “Kirov Theater” and “Bolshoi Theater” generally indicates both the opera and 
ballet companies that worked in each institution, from this point on when I use these terms I am 
referring only to the respective ballet companies.  
 
7
 Robert Strayer, Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse? Understanding Historical Change (Armonk, 
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 115-17.  
 
8
 Ibid., 99.  
 
9
 Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1991), 134.  
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reform, the implementation of secret ballot voting in elections, and established a new 
parliament to replace the Supreme Soviet.10 Gorbachev understood that the Soviet economic, 
political, and cultural system desperately needed revitalization and reform. In hindsight, it 
may appear that these measures were premeditated, however, when Gorbachev first assumed 
power he lacked a concrete vision for how the these changes should be implemented and how 
far they should extend.  
 The change in policy from above also offered hope for the realization of the long-
forgotten dreams of the members of the intelligentsia and cultural elite in Gorbachev’s age 
cohort.11 The longing for a more open society with the possibility of dissent had been halted 
by the political crackdown that had ended the relatively liberal period of the Nikita 
Khrushchev Era thaw almost twenty years earlier. Where previously only the idea of a 
“single truth” could exist, the state now tolerated “socialist pluralism,” which allowed for 
open debate within the socialist structure.12 Gorbachev enlisted the intelligentsia to 
perpetuate ideas for reform to the Soviet people and to the world.13 Political scientist Archie 
Brown argues that although the ideas and longings of public dissidents and the private wishes 
of those who had remained outwardly loyal to the system provided motivations for the 
reforms following 1985, Gorbachev’s position at the helm of the Communist Party was the 
critical factor in promulgating the impetus for change.14  
                                                 
10
 Strayer, Why Did the Soviet Union, 108- 9.  
 
11
 Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 341 
 
12
 Strayer, Why Did the Soviet Union, 101.  
 
13
 Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, 343. 
 
14
 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 11.  
 4
 Gorbachev began his tenure as General Secretary with the hopes of revitalizing a 
broken and corrupt system, but by the end of the 1980s he struggled to maintain control of 
the country. Some strongly disapproved of the new liberalizing policies, while others 
complained that reforms and change could not come fast enough. At the time, the ensuing 
environment appeared dynamic and unpredictable.15 State-sponsored opera and ballet 
theaters, institutionalized in the capital of every republic and in major cities, were not 
immune from the upheaval and chaos occurring all around. The changed political 
environment forced the ballet theaters to grabble with questions and problems that had 
previously been swept under the stage curtain. With the threat of economic instability 
looming and many of the nation’s most talented dancers flocking to the West, how did the 
country’s two preeminent ballet companies, the Bolshoi Ballet in Moscow and the Kirov 
Ballet in Leningrad, navigate the treacherous landscape of perestroika? To what extent did 
the companies embrace their newfound ability to collaborate with the West? Or, rather than 
engaging globally, would the ballet theaters attempt to continue along the relatively 
conservative path they had followed throughout much of the Soviet period? 
 I argue that, while considerable innovation occurred regarding the international 
activity of the ballet companies and dancers at both the Bolshoi and the Kirov Theaters 
during perestroika, the desire by some of the nation’s leading ballet artists for creative 
change and innovation not in line with the government’s prescribed ideal of a “Sovietized” 
ballet existed before the political watershed of 1985. At the Kirov Theater the testing of 
artistic boundaries began in the late 1970s at the behest of the company’s leadership. At the 
Bolshoi Theater, artistic transformation was pursued by some of the company’s star dancers 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., 13.  
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more than a decade before Gorbachev. The Bolshoi performers, however, faced strong 
resistance from established authority in their quest for choreographic modernization and 
artistic change, resulting in inner conflicts that have yet to be resolved and placing the 
Bolshoi in a constant flux of prolonged transition that has outlived the reigns of both the 
former Bolshoi leadership and the Soviet Union.  
 The actions of the artistic directors of each company, the Bolshoi’s Yuri Grigorovich 
and the Kirov’s Oleg Vinogradov, strongly influenced the cultural and artistic environment 
of their respective institutions. Grigorovich sought to suppress anyone who challenged his 
creative hegemony; especially the prima ballerina Maya Plisetskaya. Conversely, 
Vinogradov aimed to foster the development of young choreographers and actively invited 
Western choreographers to stage their works for Kirov dancers well before 1985. The actions 
of dancers who sympathized with Plisetskaya’s longing for artistic growth, along with those 
who supported Vinogradov’s desire for foreign contributions to the repertoire, illustrates that 
cultural ferment existed in both institutions well before the reforms of perestroika indicated 
that these artistic dreams could be fully realized.16 Due to the influence of each theater’s 
leader, however, artistic innovations in each company developed along distinct paths.17   
 I also contend that the locality of each theater contributed to the atmosphere of each 
company. Sociologist Louis Wirth has “argued that cities be viewed as discrete social 
organisms that are themselves both causes and effect of the political, economic, and cultural 
                                                 
16
 The desire for change and innovation exhibited by some ballet artists was reflective of wider trend 
of cultural ferment.  
 
17
 Although not completely without controversy, the Kirov, (today called the Mariinsky Ballet) has 
transitioned into the post Soviet period far more smoothly than the Bolshoi. The embracing of new 
and foreign choreography has not produced the vitriol seen at the Bolshoi and the Mariinsky has not 
experienced nearly as much public scandal. This, I argue may be attributable to the theater’s location 
in St. Petersburg. 
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occurrences within their boarders.”18 In Moscow, the Bolshoi’s dancers and artistic staff 
frequently interacted with members of the government elite and enjoyed luxuries, including 
plush apartments, access to special consumer goods, and dachas, reserved exclusively for 
privileged members of Soviet society. While artists based in Moscow may have benefited 
from the Soviet capital’s material offerings, their close connection to the center of power 
limited the opportunities for foreign collaboration and artistic growth at home. In Leningrad, 
performers with the Kirov Ballet fell under the central leadership’s general distrust of 
cultural and artistic life in the second city.19 Dance scholar Christina Erzahi notes, however, 
that distance from the capital also allowed the Kirov to flourish artistically in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s.20 In the realm of ballet the city continued to live up to the goals established 
at its founding as “both port and portal, the space through which western material and 
intellectual goods and ideas would flow into Russia.”21 Once under the leadership of 
Vinogradov in the late 1970s, distance from the center helped account for foreign influence 
in the ballet theater in Leningrad. 
  The uncertain economic situation also deterred artistic growth. The restructuring of 
the Soviet economy did not result in the rejuvenation of the Soviet system originally hoped 
for by Gorbachev, but instead yielded shortages of food and basic consumer goods and 
produced steep inflation. The state’s loss of tax revenue from new laws limiting alcohol sales 
                                                 
18
 Louise McReynolds, “Urbanism as a Way of Russian Life,” Journal of Urban History 20, no. 2 
(1994): 240, http://juh.sagepub.com/content/20/2/240.citation. 
 
19
 Christina Ezrahi, Swans of the Kremlin: Ballet and Power in Soviet Russia (Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 79.  
 
20
 Ibid., 72.  
 
21
 Louise McReynolds, “St. Petersburg: The National Destiny in the Cityscape,” Journal of Urban 
History 33, no. 5 (2007): 857, http://juh.sagepub.com/content/33/5/857. 
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and the declining world price of oil, a major Soviet export, further exacerbated these 
economic problems.22 The state, the main benefactor of both the Bolshoi and the Kirov, 
experienced difficulties during the Gorbachev era, which despite the strong desire of some 
ballet artists for new repertoire, impeded, with a few exceptions, the realization of innovative 
pieces and opportunities to collaborate with Western choreographers at home during this 
transition stage.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Strayer, Why Did the Soviet Union, 136.  
 
Researching Russian Ballet: Historiographic and Methodological Overview 
 
  A considerable number of scholarly works have attempted to explain the end of the 
Soviet Union, to elucidate how the Soviet system created a Gorbachev, and to offer analysis 
of the economy, society, and politics of the period.23 Relatively few studies, however, 
address the arts and artistic life during this time. Some notable exceptions include historian 
Anna Lawton’s Kinoglasnost: Soviet Cinema in Our Time, the first study dedicated to the 
cinema of the late 70s and 80s. She examines film as a cultural object shaped by the politics 
of the time and the realities of the industry and market. Journalist Andrew Solomon 
investigates visual artists and their creations during perestroika in his book The Irony Tower: 
Soviet Artists in a Time of Glasnost. Historian Alec Nove’s Glasnost in Action: Cultural 
Renaissance in Russia provides an overview of the literary landscape through 1989 and 
discusses how the political scene relates to the performing arts and other areas of high 
culture.24 Although they do no focus exclusively on the perestroika timeframe, three works 
                                                 
23
 For further reading on explaining the end of the Soviet Union, see: Steven Kotkin, Armageddon 
Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Martin Malia, The 
Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: Free Press, 1994); on the 
economy, politics, and society, see; Anders Asland, Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Jerry Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the 
U.S.S.R., 1985-1991 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997); Nancy Ries, Russian Talk: 
Culture and Conversation During Perestroika (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); and David 
Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire (New York: Random House, 1993). 
 
24
 Anna Lawton, Kinoglasnost: Soviet Cinema in Our Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992); Andrew Solomon, The Irony Tower: Soviet Artists in a Time of Glasnost (New York: Knopf, 
1991); Alec Nove, Glasnost in Action: Cultural Renaissance in Russia (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 
1989).  
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published in Russian include sections that discuss ballet during the late 1980s and early 
1990s.25 Material devoted to the performing arts during the last decade of the Soviet Union, 
however, remains scarce.  
 Considering ballet’s prominent position in Imperial Russia, its role in legitimizing 
Soviet culture, and the international headlines and popularity it garnered both inside and 
outside the Soviet Union, it is surprising that scholarship on this topic remains relatively 
limited.26 In recent years, however, scholars have begun to address this dearth. Dance 
historian Lynn Garafola’s Diaghilev’s Ballets Russes details the inner workings of the 
company’s famed Paris seasons at the beginning of the twentieth century. Scholar Tim Scholl 
examines the lasting traditions and global reach of Russian and Soviet ballet in From Petipa 
to Balanchine and The Sleeping Beauty: A Legend in Progress. Christina Ezrahi’s Swans of 
the Kremlin: Ballet and Power in Soviet Russia investigates the interaction of politics and 
ballet in the 1950s and 1960s. Ezrahi’s recently published monograph is the first scholarly 
study to analyze the Kirov and Bolshoi Ballet utilizing archival sources.  The most prominent 
Russian ballet historians, the late Vera Krasovskaya and Elizabeth Souritz have also crafted 
valuable studies. Although some translations of these investigations exist, the majority of 
their work is available only in Russian.27  
                                                 
25
 Iuliia Iakovleva, Mariinskii teatr: Balet XX vek (Moskva: Novoe Literaturnoe obozrenie, 2005): 
V.M. Gaevskii and P. Gershenzon, Razgovory o russkom balete. Kommentarii k noveishei istorii 
(Moskva: Novoe izdatel’stvo, 2010); T. Kuznetsova, Khroniki Bol’shogo baleta (Moskva: Natalis, 
2010). 
 
26
 Possible explanations for the lack of scholarly investigation could be attributed to an absence of 
Russian language ability among classical ballet experts, and conversely, a general unfamiliarity with 
ballet terminology and ballet aesthetics among those studying Russian and Soviet history. 
 
27
 Lynn Garafola, Diaghilev’s Ballets Russes (New York: Da Capo Press, 1998); Tim Scholl, From 
Petipa to Balanchine: Classical Revival and the Modernization of Ballet (New York: Routledge, 
1994); Tim Scholl, The Sleeping Beauty: A Legend in Progress (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
 10
 While all of these scholarly accounts contribute to the study of Russian and Soviet 
ballet, my study is the first to investigate the cultural phenomenon during the twilight years 
of the Soviet Union. “The 1970s and 1980s merit a separate study,” Ezrahi states, “as they 
were defined by somewhat different problems and opportunities arising before the backdrop 
of Brezhnevite stagnation and Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost.”28 I relied primarily on 
memoirs by choreographers and dancers to understand the activities of the ballet theaters 
during the late Soviet period. Dance publications in the Soviet Union, the United States, and 
Great Britain provided extensive coverage of how the political situation in the Soviet Union 
created opportunities for dancers on stages of both sides of the Iron Curtain, although in 
general these articles and interviews do not include substantive analysis on specific 
perestroika or glasnost related policies and focus chiefly on issues relevant to a dance 
audience.  
 Utilizing secondary sources, materials archived in the Jerome Robbins Dance 
Division of the New York Public Library, and a private archive, my project illuminates the 
journey of the Bolshoi and Kirov Ballet during this previously unstudied but critical era. 
Although other ballet theaters in both cities staged performances, notably, the Maly Theater 
in Leningrad and the Moscow Classical Ballet in the capital, due to the greater international 
presence of the Bolshoi and the Kirov and the availability of sources, I limit my study to the 
foremost ballet institutions of each city.  
                                                                                                                                                       
2004); Christina Ezrahi, Swans of the Kremlin: Ballet and Power in Soviet Russia (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012); Vera Krasovskaia, Vaganova: A Dance Journey from 
Petersburg to Leningrad (Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2005); Elizabeth Souritz, Soviet 
Choreographers of the 1920s trans. Lynn Vissaon, ed. Sally Banes (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1990).  
 
28
 Ezrahi, Swans of the Kremlin, 9. 
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 An examination of the ebb and flow of the activities of the two major ballet theaters 
of the Soviet Union from the late 1970s to the early 1990s complicates our perception of the 
improvisational nature of the Soviet Union’s last years and helps answer Archie Brown’s call 
for further investigation in deciphering the existing preconditions necessary for reform of the 
Soviet system.29 Twenty years after the end of the Soviet Union we know the final act of the 
ballet it danced; yet throughout the last ten years of the country’s existence no one knew of 
the nation’s impending curtain call. It is imperative, when studying the late Soviet period, to 
keep this in mind in order to prevent a deterministic analysis. By illustrating how some artists 
began to test the boundaries of what would be permissible in the public arena during this 
time, I add to existing scholarship by questioning the preconceived notion of Brezhnevite 
stagnation. In addition, my paper adds another layer of understanding to this still much-
debated period of Soviet history and reveals that, though the Soviet Union may be gone, 
unresolved conflicts and issues stemming from the Soviet era, most recently exemplified by 
the attack on Filin, remain today.  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
29
 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, 12.  
Background: Ballet in Imperial Russia and Ballet’s New Role in the Soviet Union 
 
  
 “It was a well known fact,” wrote one observer, “that the tsar’s treasury was the most 
generous in Europe for ballet.”30 Since the mid-eighteenth century, Russian ballet was 
closely associated with the tsars and aristocracy. In 1738 the Empress Anna Ivanovna (1693-
1740) established the Imperial Ballet School at her court. Under the generous patronage of 
the tsars, ballet in Imperial Russia prospered and flourished, eventually becoming the 
epicenter of the ballet world by the late nineteenth century. The tsar not only financed the 
expenses associated with the Imperial Theatre including lavish costumes, extravagant sets, a 
full orchestra, and dancers’ and choreographers’ salaries, but also financed the Imperial 
Ballet School. Talented foreign teachers, dancers, and choreographers flocked to Russia 
because of the support ballet received from the tsars and the decline in ballet experienced in 
their respective homelands.31 The most influential foreigner in Russian ballet, the French 
choreographer Marius Petipa,32 often referred to as the “father of classical ballet,” 
collaborated with composer Peter Tchaikovsky, to create many of the classic ballets still 
performed around the world today, including The Sleeping Beauty, The Nutcracker, and 
Swan Lake. While ballet in Russia enjoyed illustrious success and international prestige 
                                                 
30
 Solomon Volkov, St. Petersburg: A Cultural History (New York: Free Press, 1995), 257. 
 
31
 Some examples included famed Italian ballerina Marie Taglioni and pedagogues Christian 
Johansson of Denmark and Enrico Cecchetti of Italy.   
 
32
 Petipa spent almost his entire adult life in Russia and was affectionately referred to as Marius 
Ivanovich.  
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during the nineteenth century, the tumultuous events that rocked the country at the beginning 
of the twentieth century threatened Russian ballet’s existence. 
 Visions of ballerinas gracefully dancing across the stage of one of the most majestic 
theaters in the world clashed with the stated ambitions of the 1917 October Revolution. How 
could the Imperial Theater, an institution heavily patronized by the tsars find a role in a 
society that sought to expunge bourgeois elements from existence? To Lenin, ballet 
constituted, “a piece of pure landlord culture.”33 Despite the overt differences between 
ballerinas and Bolsheviks, the ballet theater not only survived the upheavals of 1917 but also 
thrived in Soviet society in part because Anatoly Lunacharsky, the first Soviet Commissar of 
Enlightenment whose responsibilities included supervision of the arts, fought to preserve the 
cultural traditions and legacies inherited by the Bolsheviks.34 When a debate flared over the 
value of classical ballet for the goals of the new government, Lunacharsky’s intervention 
helped the art form find a new purpose in society. At the Twelfth Party Congress of the 
Communist Party in April 1923 a resolution helped solidify the role of ballet and the theater 
in the new regime by demanding that the theater educate the proletariat, publicize the 
struggle for communism and disseminate propaganda.35  
                                                 
33
 Elizabeth Sourtiz, Soviet Choreographers in the 1920s, trans. Lynn Vissaon, ed. Sally Banes 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 13.  
 
34
 Howard R. Hotler, “The Legacy of Lunacharsky and Artistic Freedom in the USSR,” Slavic Review 
29, no. 2 (1970): 263, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2493379. 
 
35
 Mary Grace Swift, The Art of Dance in the U.S.S.R. (South Bend: University of Notre Dame 
Press), 61. 
 
 14
 Senior Petrograd36 ballet critic Aleksandr Pleshcheev commented about the 
popularity of ballet among its new spectators: “The new audience, the masses who flocked to 
the ballet after its liberation from the subscribers, took a definitive stand: It valued the ballet 
and chose it as an accessible art. . . . The popular audience is sensitive, responsive, and 
perceptive.”37 The popularity of the ballet was reflected in the fact that performances 
frequently sold out and performances continued uninterrupted throughout the Civil War 
period despite immense hardships.38 Although he had once admonished ballet as “landlord 
culture,” even Lenin understood that the people would never forgive the Bolsheviks for 
allowing the dissolution of their cultural legacy when he later remarked, “It is too early for us 
to hand over the heritage of bourgeois art to the archives.”39 The superiority of Russian ballet 
had come to occupy a source of inspiration and pride for its audience members and 
demanded a second act.40  
 The avant-garde ballets of the 1920s, choreographed by the Kirov Ballet’s then 
Artistic Director Fedor Lopukhov, however, enjoyed little critical acclaim or public success. 
The relative artistic freedoms enjoyed by artists of all genres during the New Economic 
Policy would be short lived. The following two decades brought declarations from the Party 
                                                 
36
 After the outbreak of World War I the city of St. Petersburg was renamed Petrograd, as the former 
name sounded too German. After the death of Lenin in 1924 the city was again renamed and became 
Leningrad. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 the city’s inhabitants voted to 
return back to the city’s original name of St. Petersburg.  
 
37
 A. Pleshcheev, “O balete, ego demokratizatsii, fokinizatsii i pr.,” Vechernie ogni, no. 8 (March 29, 
1918): 4.   
 
38
 Sourtiz, Soviet Choreographers, 43-44. 
 
39
 Ibid., 122. 
 
40
 Martin J. Gannon, Understanding Global Cultures: Metaphorical Journeys through 28 Nations, 
Clusters of Nations, and Continents (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 341. 
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that stifled creativity in the theaters. In the 1930s, the quest to produce ballets that aligned 
with the precepts of socialist realism, art that illustrated an idealized socialist utopia for 
purposes of propaganda, proved difficult.41 Despite having little in common with the ideals 
of socialist realism, the ballets created at the Imperial Theater during the tenure of Marius 
Petipa, complete with fairies, swans, and princesses continued to be performed in Moscow 
and Leningrad and remained popular with audiences. These ballets were deemed 
ideologically acceptable and stretched to fit into the cannon of socialist realism because of 
their general theme of “good overcoming evil.”42 Despite ballet’s aristocratic origins, it fell 
into the cannon of kulturnost’ or official Soviet culture. Stalin had an affinity for Swan 
Lake,43and historian Sheila Fitzpatrick notes, “the wife of a manager who was ignorant of 
Pushkin and had never seen Swan Lake was an embarrassment.”44 
 The Stalin-Zhdanov decree of 1946, whose policy became known as zhdanovshchina, 
further hampered creativity in the theaters by granting the party direct control over culture. 
According to historian Vladislav Zubok this, “killed genuine creativity, caused self 
censorship to metastasize, and opened the doors to mediocrities, careerists and intriguers.”45 
While the degree to which the government enforced zhdanovshchina varied throughout the 
Soviet period, Zubok’s assertion is illustrated in the process of deciding whether new 
choreographic works should receive premieres. New ballets, like choreographer Rostislav 
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Zakharov’s “Russia” Has Come into Port (1964), received a recommendation for public 
performance from the Kirov’s artistic council because of its inclusion of ideologically correct 
content.46 The council disregarded the production’s universally acknowledged poor artistic 
quality in order to meet the state’s demand for ballets that expressed sovermennost’ or 
contemporaneity.47 Therefore, depending on the current political situation, new ballets could 
aim to express Marxist ideals and principals, Soviet patriotism, or the superiority of the 
Soviet system over the West.48  
  For some of the dancers performing in ballets on Soviet topics the choreography also 
constituted a source of artistic frustration. In her memoirs, famed dancer Natalia Makarova 
states, “At times, I was embarrassed to come out on stage – the choreography was so 
ridiculous.”49 In describing the ballet by choreographer Igor Bel’skii, Leningrad Symphony 
(1961), which depicted the Leningrad Siege during World War II, Makarova lamented, “I 
couldn’t bear to get down on my knee with a weapon at the ready – the gesture was too 
ordinary, not removed enough from reality, and therefore false. . . . I felt the gesture to be 
alien to ballet in general.”50 Makarova’s complaints reflect how the government’s insistence 
for ballets about contemporary Soviet themes often trumped the creation of ballets with high 
artistic merit. Despite the creative limitations placed on the theaters, the guidelines for what 
stylistic elements were needed to constitute a “Soviet” ballet evolved over time from the 
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drambalet fashion (ballets that consisted more of acting and pantomime than actual dancing 
and lacked complex choreography) of the 1940s and 50s, to the reintegration of formal dance 
vocabulary back into choreography, best embodied by Grigorovich’s works.  
 During the Cold War battle for cultural supremacy with the United States, ballet 
artists became delegates of Soviet culture abroad. The preeminence of Soviet ballet played an 
essential role in the fight to prove the superiority of the socialist system over capitalism. 
Scholar David Caute has argued that “never before had empires felt so compelling a need to 
prove their virtue, to demonstrate their spiritual superiority, to claim the high ground of 
progress, to win public support and admiration by gaining ascendancy in each and every 
event which might be styled the Culture Olympics.”51 With the ostensible goal of promoting 
understanding between peoples of rival nations and the clandestine ambition to secure the 
sympathies of the citizens of their foe, the Soviet government utilized members of both the 
Kirov and the Bolshoi as cultural representatives on the other side of the Iron Curtain.52  
 Following Khrushchev’s state visit to Great Britain in April 1956 and the subsequent 
initiative to advance cultural exchange between the two countries undertaken by Minister of 
Culture, Nikolai Mikhailov, the Bolshoi embarked on its first tour abroad to London at the 
beginning of October 1956. 53 The tour enjoyed both public and critical acclaim from the 
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British people.54 Over 55,000 people queued into the Royal Opera House over the course of 
the ten day tour; and over 9.5 million people, half of the adult television audience in Britain, 
gathered around their television sets to watch the BBC broadcast prima ballerina Galina 
Ulanova dance the second act of Swan Lake.55 While British critics voiced some criticism 
about the Soviet style and choreography, Soviet authorities viewed the enormous public 
enthusiasm for the tour as a win in their quest to “capture the imagination of the West.”56 The 
Bolshoi followed up its London tour with its first trip to the United States in 1959. While 
both tours enjoyed immense public success, the ballet artists toured under strict state control. 
Dancers could not travel without close supervision and specially appointed chaperones. 
Dancers of “questionable” background were barred altogether from the tours abroad.57 The 
Kirov followed soon thereafter with tours to both England and America. Exchanges also 
worked in the opposite direction. The New York City Ballet performed in the Soviet Union 
for the first time in 1962.  
 Even though the ballet sought to advance the political and diplomatic goals of the 
Soviet government, through the objectives outlined at the Twelfth Party Congress and later 
through Cold War tours abroad, Ezrahi argues that ballet resisted the artistic limitations 
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imposed by the government and truly failed to ever become “Sovietized.”58 Ezrahi claims 
“the glory of the Kirov and Bolshoi Ballet companies continued to rest on the “class-alien” 
heritage of the prerevolutionary classical ballet repertoire created under the patronage of the 
tsars,”59 and that “the ambiguity inherent in any system created room for the artistic 
repossession of creative freedom.”60 While Ezrahi’s study concludes in 1968, I believe her 
argument concerning the pursuit of creative independence remained visible and increased at 
the Kirov under the leadership of Vinogradov, ceased at the Bolshoi under the control of 
Grigorovich, but remained alive in Moscow through the efforts of some of the leading 
Bolshoi dancers. 
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Dancing to the West and Back 
 
 
  The year 1979 was a tense time in Soviet-American relations. The United States had 
responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with diplomatic protests, economic 
sanctions, and political threats; relations also became strained over America’s new 
relationship with China.61 Additionally, the company’s prolonged absence can be explained 
by three major defections that rocked the troupe on the fateful 1979 tour. During the 
company’s New York City leg, the Bolshoi’s male star Alexander Godunov sought asylum.62 
After his defection, Godunov received a contract to dance with Mikhail Baryshnikov’s 
American Ballet Theater.63 Three weeks later husband and wife Lenoid and Valentina 
Kozlov also asked for political refuge while touring with the Bolshoi in Los Angeles. The 
married couple subsequently began work with New York City Ballet.  
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 Seven years later high profile defection scandals no longer constituted a serious 
concern because of the new political environment. In 1986 the Bolshoi embarked on its first 
tour to America since 1979. One of the most visible signs of perestroika in the ballet theaters 
was manifested in an increased rate of international touring for full companies, especially to 
North America, and the opportunity for individual dancers to obtain guest contracts with 
foreign companies. This marked the first time in the Soviet era that individual dancers could 
regularly seek work outside of the country and then return home and continue working. 
While during the 1950s and 1960s the ballet companies and dancers toured abroad as pieces 
of the government’s cultural cold war, now they ventured through a gradually lifting iron 
curtain to promote the Soviet Union’s new “human face” to the world.64 Motivations for 
touring and working abroad stemmed from a constant shortage of hard currency and 
opportunities for artistic growth. Touring and obtaining guest artist contracts provided the 
means for both the troupes and the dancers to survive during this often-unpredictable time. 
The newfound ease of international travel benefited not only dancers still residing in the 
Soviet Union, but also Soviet dancers who had earlier fled their native country. 
  The Bolshoi sought to profit from the acclaim and success it garnered abroad. After 
the Bolshoi’s triumphant 1986 American tour the company returned to the United States 
again in 1989 and 1990. A description of a typical trip illuminates the reach of the tour across 
the country and how the company chose to present itself to American audiences through 
repertoire choice. Over the course of two months, for example, the 1990 tour stopped in New 
York City, Washington, D.C., Chicago, Los Angeles, San Diego, Honolulu, and Boston. The 
company primarily presented heritage classics including Swan Lake, Romeo and Juliet, and 
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Giselle, along with Grigorovich’s Ivan the Terrible and a mixed bill program composed of 
scenes from Soviet classics including Grigorovich’s Spartacus and The Golden Age.65 The 
Bolshoi also toured extensively throughout Western Europe, Brazil, China, and Japan.   
 The Kirov took advantage of the new political situation in 1986 to embark on its first 
North American tour since the 1960s. The company returned to the United States again in 
1987 and 1989. Cities on the itinerary for the two-month 1989 tour included New York City, 
Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Costa Mesa. The troupe presented Giselle, The 
Sleeping Beauty, Le Corsaire, La Bayadare, Vinogradov’s Battleship Potemkin and a mixed 
bill program.66 Bolshoi and Kirov souvenir programs have glossy color photographs and 
contain analogous features, which contrasts sharply from the prosaic programs available for 
purchase at performances in the Soviet Union.67 The souvenir programs constitute an 
example of ballet diplomacy. The booklets describe the respective illustrious histories of 
each company, occasionally include a letter of welcome from the American president, and 
often the phrase “direct from the USSR,” all of which highlight the political as well as artistic 
significance of each tour and points towards the utilization of Western style marketing.  
 The companies’ travel stemmed from the need to attain hard currency to meet 
expenses. Once subsidized completely by the Soviet government, both theaters struggled to 
cover their expenses once the general economic climate deteriorated and the weakening 
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government could no longer guarantee the funds to operate. “The entire budget that we have 
from the state in the form of grants is barely enough to pay the salaries,” Vinogradov 
remarked to a Dance Magazine contributor.68 The incessant touring by both companies 
fueled criticism in the press from the ballet scholar Vera Krasovskaya who chastised both 
Grigorovich and Vinogradov for abandoning the home audience in pursuit of capital.69 
 Touring also financially assisted individual dancers at every level of the company, 
from the girls in the back row of the corps de ballet to the principal ballerinas, supplementing 
their monthly salaries with extra payments for performances on tour in the form of hard 
currency. While the star dancers at the Bolshoi could receive up to 550 rubles a month, twice 
the national average, the salary for members of the corps ranged from 120 to 180 rubles a 
month.70 Leading dancers from both companies also aimed to secure their own economic 
independence, and in some cases artistic independence as well, by negotiating guest artist 
contracts with foreign ballet companies.  
 In 1988, Bolshoi stars Nina Ananiashvili and Andris Liepa negotiated a three-week 
guest artist contract with the New York City Ballet (NYCB). At the invitation of Peter 
Martins, NYCB’s artistic director, the Soviet dancers performed in NYCB founder George 
Balanchine’s Raymonda Variations and Symphony in C.71 This trip not only financially 
benefited the Bolshoi superstars, but also provided an opportunity for collaboration and 
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artistic growth through learning and performing new chorographic works. The difference in 
Balanchine’s style of choreography from the Soviet style, however, proved difficult for both 
dancers to master. In an interview with Dance Magazine about her appearances with NYCB 
Ananiashvili stated, “I’m amazed by the incredibly difficult small details of technique that 
the company performs so effortlessly. That has been the greatest problem for us because we 
don’t move like that in our own ballets. . . . When we go home, we can show what we’ve 
learned--certain kinds of transitions, for instance.”72 
  Before 1985, the idea of Soviet dancers performing Balanchine ballets in America, 
and then flying back to the Soviet Union without incident would have been unimaginable. 
Other star dancers from both companies also began making guest appearances abroad to 
supplement their incomes and artistic experiences at home. Leading dancers with the Bolshoi 
and the Kirov learned the solo and principal parts in the classical repertoire early in their 
careers and often performed these roles on stage only one or two times a month.73 The 
combination of few premières, little possibility to learn new roles and choreography at home, 
and a dancer’s relatively short stage career prompted many artists to seek international 
opportunities to expand their artistic growth.74 
 The Bolshoi star Irek Mukhamedov and Kirov dancers Altynai Asylmuratova and 
Faroukh Ruzimatov all leapt at the new opportunities to work abroad and explore new roles. 
For example, Rudolf Nureyev, while directing the Paris Opera Ballet, invited Mukhamedov 
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to dance The Prince, the male lead, in Nureyev’s staging of The Sleeping Beauty.75 In almost 
a decade at the Bolshoi, Mukhamedov never once danced in this staple of the Bolshoi 
repertory. In the Soviet Union the role of the Prince was considered a preimer danseur role, 
and therefore due to Mukhamedov’s bulky muscular physique, which some thought created 
unappealing balletic bodylines, Grigorovich never cast him in this part. Mukhamedov also 
attained guest artist contracts with companies in England and other Western European 
countries.   
 Some Soviet dancers, however, expanded their time abroad from a few performances 
over a span of several weeks to an entire year of performing. Liepa returned to America as a 
guest artist for a whole season with American Ballet Theater in 1990.76 “There no one, 
except for me decides my creative questions,” Liepa explained to a Soviet readership how 
artists worked in America. “The artist has a contract for a year, and after that, if he is 
unhappy he can leave. Or, for example, he can tell the artistic director of the company that he 
has received an invitation to dance the new season with a different company, and will then 
subsequently return.”77 In an American press interview Liepa credited his new freedom of 
mobility to the new regime, “I think the authorities got tired of everybody defecting to the 
West; your ballet got better and better while ours got weaker and weaker. Maybe they finally 
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listened to all the artists who later said they would prefer to live in Russia if they could be 
free to travel and try new things. Now we can do that.”78  
 Unprecedented exchanges also occurred between the artistic staff of Soviet ballet 
institutions and American ballet companies and ballet schools. In May 1990 former Kirov 
Ballet Artistic Director Konstantin Sergeev and his wife, former ballerina Natalia 
Dudinskaia, staged Sergeev’s 1950 production of Swan Lake at the Boston Ballet, 
incorporating both American and Soviet dancers in the production.79 Dubbed the “glasnost 
Swan Lake” because the realization of the production could have occurred only as a result of 
Soviet reforms, the première marked the first ever full-scale partnership between American 
and Soviet ballet artists.80 American ballet students also expressed excitement and 
enthusiasm when Soviet pedagogues traveled to the United States to teach American dancers 
at popular ballet summer intensives. The Bolshoi Ballet Academy at Vail, Colorado, started 
accepting students for a 1989 summer session that brought the head of the Bolshoi Ballet 
School in Moscow, Sophia Golovkina, to teach American students.81 In the fall of 1990, 
President George H.W. Bush welcomed Oleg Vinogradov along with five other Soviet 
teachers to Washington, D.C., to begin teaching classes at the newly established Kirov 
Academy of Ballet. The school aimed to train its students for careers as professional ballet 
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dancers. Vinogradov and the artistic staff selected aspiring dancers for the school from all 
over the United States on a national audition tour.82  
 The increased mobility of Soviet artists extended to dancers living in the Soviet 
Union as well as to Soviet dancers who had grabbed international headlines for defecting in 
the 1960s and 1970s. On February 1, 1989, Makarova chasséd onto the stage of the Kirov 
Theater for the first time in eighteen years. Nearly two decades earlier while on tour with the 
Kirov Ballet in London, Makarova caused an international uproar when she sought political 
asylum in the West. Her return to Leningrad marked the first time a dancer who had defected 
received permission to perform on Soviet soil.83 Notably, instead of choosing to present one 
of the many works of the Russian classical ballet repertoire, such as Swan Lake or The 
Sleeping Beauty, Makarova and her French partner danced two pas de deuxs from British 
choreographer John Cranko’s Eugene Onegin.84 Makarova’s homecoming constituted the 
realization of a previously impossible dream for the famed ballerina. Just eight years earlier 
after being questioned about her desire to perform again in her native country, Makarova 
responded, “It’s impossible, so why think about it?”85 
 The newfound ability to fulfill Makarova’s formerly unimaginable wish may have 
stemmed from the recent overturning in spring 1988 of the Stalinist policy of 
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zhdanovshchina, which had granted the Party control over life in the cultural sphere.86  
Defector stars Rudolf Nureyev and Mikhail Baryshnikov also received invitations to perform 
in their homeland in 1989. Nureyev had been granted permission the prior year to visit his 
dying mother in Ufa; however, his visit was kept secret from the public and only those close 
to the Nureyev family knew of his trip.87 Nureyev’s public return, in which he performed the 
male lead in La Sylphide at the Kirov, occurred in November 1989.88 Markarova and 
Nureyev received enthusiastic praise from the public, along with showers of flowers and 
gifts. Both dancers, however, were well past the heyday of their stage careers, and the Soviet 
press and the public lamented the missed opportunities to see these stars perform in their 
prime. The Kozlovs’ first voyage back to their homeland transpired in 1991 when they 
participated in an international dance festival in Moscow. Some celebrated dancers had more 
complicated relationships with their Soviet pasts. Notably, Baryshnikov rejected the chance 
to perform in the Soviet Union until after its demise.89 Despite the celebrations and successes 
of returned stars and the integration of Soviet dancers with the West, the artistic director of 
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the main ballet theater in the nation’s capital disregarded the transformations occurring 
around him and continued to cling to power and resist change despite protestations from 
dancers and, eventually, the press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The Stalin of Soviet Ballet” 
 
 
 In January 1989 Irek Mukhamedov failed to appear at Convent Garden in London to 
perform at a fund-raising gala benefiting victims of the recent Armenian earthquake. Even 
though at this time the Soviet Union enjoyed a more relaxed political environment, rumors 
circulated that Mukhamedov, who was handpicked by Grigorovich to join the Bolshoi as a 
principal dancer after winning the 1980 Moscow international ballet competition, desired to 
settle permanently in the West and that KGB agents were responsible for Mukhamedov’s 
unexplained absence. These rumors, however, proved to be false. Mukhamedov’s 
nonappearance in London resulted from the eruption of ongoing tension at the Bolshoi 
Theater between Grigorovich and dancers in the company. Mukhamedov stayed in Moscow 
in order to speak on behalf of Grigorovich at a meeting of the Bolshoi Ballet Collective. 
 Members of the collective had organized the gathering to appeal to the General 
Director of the Bolshoi Theater, Vladimir Kokonin, and through him to the minister of 
culture, to demand a change in the troupe’s artistic leadership. Mukhamedov, a staunch 
Grigorovich supporter, chastised those at the gathering for creating trouble for the company, 
accused them of betraying not only Grigorovich but also their country, and called for the 
dancers of the previous generation to retire in order to create room for young blood.90 Several 
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years later, reflecting on his remarks, Mukhamedov deeply regretted the words he spoke at 
that meeting in defense of a man who many had come to view as the Stalin of Soviet ballet.91   
 Yuri Grigorovich arrived at the Bolshoi Ballet, a company composed of over two 
hundred dancers, in 1964 fresh off the triumph of his successful stagings of Legend of Love 
and The Stone Flower in Leningrad. Born in the second city in the late 1920s, Grigorovich 
had trained at the Leningrad Choreographic Institute,92 and danced briefly with the Kirov 
Ballet before beginning his career as a choreographer. He represents an example of artistic 
talent transferred by the government from Leningrad to Moscow. During his years at the 
Moscow-based company, Grigorovich created numerous Soviet classics including Spartacus, 
Ivan the Terrible, and The Golden Age, and also restaged classical heritage ballets. Many in 
Leningrad considered Grigorovich and his early works products of the Khrushchev era thaw. 
Although they broke free from the drambalet style, which emphasized acting over dancing, 
of the Soviet ballets of the 1940s and 50s, his ballets still retained Soviet themes.93 Spartacus 
fit the bill for a Soviet ballet because of its score, created by Soviet composer Aram 
Khachaturian, and the ability to draw comparisons between its historical plot, slaves facing 
oppression in ancient Rome, to oppression experienced in modern times by those living in 
capitalist countries.94  
 The creation of ballets reflecting Soviet themes and topics took on special 
significance at the Bolshoi, for the ballet company not only had to perform on its home stage, 
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but was also required to present productions on the Kremlin Palace of Deputies stage, which 
had been built specifically for Party meetings and activities. Ezrahi asserts that the Bolshoi’s 
presence at this theater signified the Moscow company’s closeness to political power and that 
this association also brought its set of own problems.95 Although Ezrahi does not elaborate 
on these issues, I believe that over time the pressures associated with the obligation to 
frequently perform for top Party officials resulted in the company’s leadership imposing a 
stricter adherence to Soviet artistic standards in the capital.  
 The pressure to create for the top brass of the Party may help account for 
Grigorvich’s transformation from celebrated choreographer to “mini-Stalin.” In her 
autobiography, Bolshoi principal Ekaterina Maksimova recalls the wonderful working 
relationship and friendship she enjoyed with Grigorovich during his early years at the theater, 
but then notes a gradual negative change in their relations and the artistic director’s 
behavior.96 Previously, if Maksimova offered suggestions to the ballet master when in 
rehearsals he gladly accepted them and it did not matter to anyone whether these proposals 
ended up in the final piece of choreography.97 As time progressed, however, suggestions, no 
matter how well intended, were viewed by Grigorovich as a personal insult and a question of 
his authority.98 Grigorovich’s thirty-year tenure at the Bolshoi Ballet also included scandal, 
deep-seeded conflict, and a loss of creative prowess. The Bolshoi emerged at a cross section 
between international and personal politics. With the commencement of the political 
                                                 
95
 Ibid., 214. 
 
96
 Ekaterina Maksimova, Madam “net” (Moskva: AST-Press kn, 2003), 205. 
 
97
 Ibid. 
 
98
 Ibid., 206. 
 
 33
crackdown that ended the thaw, Grigorovich’s leadership style soon reflected that which 
resided in the Kremlin; in order to live and work in peace one needed to keep the status quo 
and not outwardly defy authority. This, however, did not stop some of the most famous 
dancers at the Bolshoi from trying to find their own creative fulfillment.  
 Even before the onset of perestroika and glasnost star Bolshoi dancers sought to 
challenge Grigorovich’s choreographic and artistic hegemony despite his firm grasp on 
power. Ballet artists, including the internationally celebrated prima ballerina Maya 
Plisetskaya, husband and wife team Vladimir Vasiliev and Ekaterina Maksimova, and dancer 
Mikhail Lavrovskii all clamored to find their own artistic voices and independence. In a 1976 
television interview after the premiere of Grigorovich’s ballet Angara, which showcases a 
dam-construction team in Irkutsk, Vasiliev harshly criticized both the ballet and the 
choreography.99 In 1979 Grigorovich created a new version of the classic Romeo and Juliet 
to replace the 1950s production by Leonid Lavrovskii. Outraged over the poor quality of 
Grigorovich’s choreography and the ousting of a treasured piece, Vasiliev, Maksimova, and 
M. Lavrovskii successfully petitioned the Ministry of Culture to restore the original ballet to 
the Bolshoi’s repertoire.100 
 Lead dancers at the Bolshoi, who, with the exception of the elder Plisetskaya, all 
came of age during the thaw, wanted to dance choreography that utilized movement outside 
of the traditional classroom vocabulary and borrow movement from the flourishing world of 
modern dance, something that Grigorovich strongly opposed incorporating into the Bolshoi 
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repertoire.101 Those who opposed Grigorovich enjoyed occasional small victories, but found 
true artistic freedom only outside the walls of the Bolshoi Theater, either through special 
permission to travel abroad, or once the political situation became more relaxed, by the 
greater opportunities to travel internationally.  
 Although these Bolshoi dancers dealt with impediments to their creative dreams 
throughout Grigorovich’s tenure, until Godunov’s 1979 flight every major defection, 
beginning with Nureyev in 1961, had involved a Kirov dancer. What accounts for this exodus 
from Leningrad but not from the capital? Each dancer had his or her own personal reasons 
for remaining in the Soviet Union; however, the Bolshoi’s location in Moscow undoubtedly 
played a role in the lack of defections from the country’s preeminent theater.  Historian 
Vladislav Zubok asserts that mini artistic and intellectual “oases” existed in Moscow in the 
1970s, which helped the creative and intellectual elite persevere through the Brezhnev 
years.102 “The separation of intellectuals and artists,” which I assert included star Bolshoi 
dancers, “from the rest of the Soviet population by a network of privileges and special access 
to material benefits was, paradoxically, a contributing factors in the continuation and 
preservation of their oases.”103 The significant number of high profile defections from the 
Kirov illustrates that Zubok’s idea of  “oases” did not necessarily exist in Leningrad as well. 
While the dancers in Moscow could find solace away from Grigorovich in their mini “oases,” 
until the arrival of Vinogradov in 1977 the Kirov dancers had to take the more drastic step of 
defection in order to escape.  
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 Maya Plisetskaya created her own personal oasis during Grigorovich’s reign in 
Moscow. Plisetskaya had already been performing with the Bolshoi for twenty years when 
Grigorovich became artistic director in 1964. After two decades dancing in the leading roles 
of classical ballet, Plisetskaya yearned for new artistic and creative challenges. She lamented, 
“Dancing the old repertoire . . . would it really be like this to the end of my ballet days? Just 
Swan Lake? Anxiety tormented me. Frustration. I needed something new, something my 
own.”104 In 1967 she utilized her influence as a winner of the Lenin Prize to acquire for 
herself a ballet outside of the theater repertoire. Plisetskaya worked with Cuban 
choreographer Alberto Alonso to create the ballet Carmen Suite. As a rule, foreign 
choreographers did not receive invitations to work at the Bolshoi, but because Alonso hailed 
from Cuba, a brother socialist country, Plisetskaya obtained special permission for the 
choreographer to work at the capital theater.105  
 While collaborating with Alonso proved artistically gratifying for Plisetskaya, after 
the first performance, which received mostly negative reviews, the prima ballerina still faced 
a struggle securing more performance dates for the piece and in retaining its original 
choreography.106 The Soviet Minister of Culture Ekaterina Furtseva proclaimed, “It’s a great 
failure comrades. The production is raw. Nothing but eroticism . . . the concept has to be 
rethought. I have grave doubts whether the ballet can be redone. It’s an alien path.”107 
Furtseva also demanded a change to the costumes and the removal of “provocative lifts” 
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from the choreography.108 Plisetskaya had aspired to perform the piece on the Bolshoi’s 
upcoming Canadian tour, but the Ministry of Culture forbade the work from being danced 
abroad because it was not thought to be representative of the prestige of the Bolshoi Theater 
and did not conform to the cultural image the Soviet Union insisted on presenting abroad.109  
 Despite the disappointment surrounding Carmen Suite, Plisetskaya did not relent in 
her quest to seek her own creative outlet and her fierce pursuit of independence made her an 
enemy of Grigorovich. After several great struggles with cultural authorities her desire to 
work with other Western choreographers was eventually fulfilled and she even began to 
choreograph pieces for herself. In the 1970s she worked with French choreographers Mauric 
Bejart and Roland Petit in their home country. Trips abroad were still available only to a 
select privileged group of artists and intellectuals. Zubok asserts that these trips constituted 
another kind of oasis for the elite, “the trips gave the temporary effect of euphoria, liberation, 
and excitement, while offering an escape from the squalor, humiliation, and fear of everyday 
Soviet life.”110  
 Plisetskaya built upon her own personal oasis at home when she received permission 
to choreograph the ballets Anna Karenina (1972), The Seagull (1980), and Lady with a 
Lapdog (1985) at the Bolshoi. Plisetskaya battled vigorously for each of her victories, and  
no other Bolshoi dancer enjoyed the same extent of privileges during Grigorovich’s tenure. 
Commenting on Plisetskaya in her autobiography, Makarova characterizes Plisetskaya’s 
behavior as a “phenomenon particularly characteristic of Moscow,” and goes on to note that 
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similar actions in Leningrad were not tolerated.111 Plisetskaya’s struggle against the artistic 
director’s dominance, however, opened the door for others to push for similar opportunities, 
resulting in a deep division in the company that became public knowledge with the 
publishing of established ballet critic Vadim Gaevsky’s 1981 book entitled Divertissement.112 
 In Divertissement, Gaevsky delineates the development of classical ballet in Russia 
and the Soviet Union over the previous hundred and fifty years. Controversy over the book’s 
publication centered around a small section that sheds light on the internal quarrels at the 
Bolshoi and criticizes Grigorovich’s leadership of the company.113 Gaevsky divides members 
of the troupe into two camps; those who supported Grigorovich, which included among 
others the artistic director’s wife Natalia Bessmertnova, and those who opposed the head 
ballet master, including Plisetskaya, Maksimova, and Vasiliev. Gaevsky cites the main 
impetus for the split as the dancers’ desire for more modern choreography and a broader 
choreographic vocabulary.114 It is interesting to note that dancers primarily from the older 
generations constituted the group that opposed Grigorovich, while younger dancers remained 
loyal to the ballet master. The opposing positions, based on age, likely stemmed from the 
relatively short stage life of a dancer’s career: older dancers literally had less time to dance 
new choreography, and the younger dancers viewed Grigorovich as someone who could help 
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them establish a successful career.115 Gaevsky also attributed the company’s lack of 
innovation to Grigorovich and accused him of being a mini dictator.116  
 Soviet authorities banned the book and removed it from store shelves. The volume’s 
editor, Serge Nikolin, was expelled from his editorial position and authorities prohibited 
Gaevsky from publishing for the next five years.117 Had the book been produced six or seven 
years later the controversy surrounding its publication would certainly not have arisen. 
Gaevsky’s 1981 book seems to foreshadow the proliferation of periodicals, newspaper 
articles, and other texts that critique the Soviet regime and its leaders at the end of the 1980s, 
and also exposes the inner workings and conflicts of the Bolshoi into the public eye.  
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The Intersection of Personal vs. International Politics 
 
 
 The infighting at the Bolshoi left Grigorovich without a star male dancer who 
exhibited loyalty to the artistic director. By the beginning of the 1980s, Vasiliev and 
Lavrovskii had long fallen out of favor with Grigorovich and declared their allegiances with 
the older generation. Grigorovich found the male star he sought, someone young who would 
not question his artistic authority in Irek Mukhamedov. Mukhamedov had graduated from the 
Moscow Ballet School in 1978, but had been initially passed over for a spot at the Bolshoi 
and danced with the Moscow Classical Ballet.118 Entering the Bolshoi as the young protégé 
of the artistic director meant Mukhamedov had very little contact or interaction with the 
dancers who opposed the head ballet master.  
 Grigorovich created the male lead of his 1982-piece The Golden Age for 
Mukhamedov, set to music by Dmitri Shostakovich. It was the last new work that 
Grigorovich choreographed and echoed the ballet master’s previous works. The ballet has 
been described as “a simple tale of communist ideals vanquishing bourgeois decadence”119 
and, although it represented a new piece of choreography, it did not achieve the same level of 
choreographic innovation as works by George Balanchine or Maurice Bejart. An American 
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dance critic commented that “Grigorovich’s choreography is an acquired taste – you either 
find it exciting to watch or see it as merely a display of gymnastic virtuosity.”120 
 As the decade progressed and public criticism in the press became more widespread 
Grigorovich’s leadership of the Bolshoi came under attack and publicly pitted those who 
supported the artistic director against those who rejected his authority. Mukhamedov, the 
brightest young star at the Bolshoi at the time, assumed the role of Grigorovich’s main 
supporter, while stars of the older generation, including Plisetksaya, distanced themselves 
from the head ballet master.  Both sides frequently found themselves at the convergence of 
international and personal politics.  
 Under the openness of the glasnost era the personal loyalties and divisions within the 
theater were increasingly transparent. Worried about the position of their director, 
Grigorovich defenders expressed their discontent over the criticism of their ballet master by 
refusing to take to the stage at a March 1988 performance of The Stone Flower. The dancers 
in Grigorovich’s camp were worried about Grigorovich being removed from his post and 
demanded a personal guarantee from Gorbachev that the artistic director would not be 
replaced. Grigorovich’s followers called on Mukhamedov to appeal directly to the General 
Secretary on behalf of the ballet master. After speaking with Mukhamedov, Gorbachev called 
in the minister of culture to reassure the protesting dancers that Grigorovich’s position was 
secure and the performance finally began.121  
 Despite the assurance of his security, later the same year Grigorovich reluctantly 
caved into the demand for modernism at the ballet theater and invited Roland Petit to stage 
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his 1959 ballet, Cyrano de Bergerac. Petit desired for Grigorovich to allow Mukhamedov to 
dance the main role in the ballet.122 Mukhamedov, naïve to the politics of the situation, 
agreed to dance the part thereby infuriating Grigorovich who viewed the dancer’s willingness 
to work with Petit as a personal betrayal.123  
 After personally intervening on behalf of Grigorovich several times124 and receiving 
little gratitude or acknowledgement in return, combined with the desire to escape from a 
jealous ex-wife and provide for a new baby, Mukhamedov considered permanently leaving 
the Bolshoi Theater.125 The opportunities to dance abroad could no longer completely satisfy 
Mukhamedov artistically, and now that he had fallen out of favor with Grigorovich he knew 
that if he remained in Moscow he would spend the last viable years of his performing career 
constantly in conflict with the artistic director.  
  After much thought and planning, in June 1990, Mukhamedov and his second wife, 
also a dancer with the Bolshoi, decided to quietly leave the Soviet Union for England. 
Mukhamedov received a contract to dance with the Royal Ballet of London. Perhaps 
Mukhamedov also thought of the fate of Andris Liepa’s father, Marius Liepa, an acclaimed 
dancer at the Bolshoi for years, who, after a falling out with Grigorovich, struggled to find 
artistic fulfillment. In a diary entry dated March 14, 1982, he wrote “any artist can continue 
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without money, even for sometime without love, without friends. . . . But he cannot live, 
survive without new roles, without new work. He suffocates.”126  
 Unwilling to “suffocate,” Plisetskaya, Maksimova, and Vasiliev were forced out of 
the Bolshoi company during the 1987-88 season, ostensibly because all three dancers had 
long ago surpassed the usual dancer retirement age of thirty-eight, but also because of their 
opposition to Grigorovich.127 None of the dancers, however, retired from performing. 
Although they no longer frequently danced the roles that had launched them into stardom, 
Plisetskaya as Odette/Odiele in Swan Lake and Vasiliev as the title role in Spartacus, they 
still performed in their own ballets. They each received countless offers to dance abroad and 
perform modern roles.128  
 Traditionally, upon reaching retirement age dancers are invited to work as teachers 
and coaches in the ballet school and with the main company from which they retired in order 
to ensure proper technique, to help interpret the nuances of different ballet roles, and, more 
generally, to assure that ballet traditions are passed down from one generation to the next. 
Grigorovich’s halting of this custom in favor of his authority was a great loss to the 
theater.129 Even if those who opposed Grigorovich had been invited to work with the 
company as artistic coaches, it is doubtful if young dancers would have been willing to 
collaborate with the retired stars who had opposed the artistic director out of fear of the 
possible repercussions.  
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 In April 1989, to mark his fiftieth birthday, Vasiliev acquired permission to present 
his own choreographic works on the Bolshoi stage for the first time. At this jubilee 
performance, Vasiliev danced in Anyuta, and the one-act ballets Nostalgia and Fragments of 
One Biography. Vasiliev had choreographed and presented these works earlier in the decade 
at different theaters across Europe. The première of Anyuta, for example, occurred at the San 
Carlo Theater in Naples, Italy. To fill the other roles in the ballets, dancers from the Moscow 
Classical Ballet were used because the Bolshoi could not provide the needed dancers.130 I 
suspect the combination of Bolshoi dancers involved in other engagements abroad and a fear 
of participating in a performance with an adversary of the artistic director, who certainly 
could not have been enthusiastic about the performance, explains the “shortage” of available 
dancers in a company of over two hundred members. 
 Glasnost had finally allowed for public criticism of Grigorovich, yet the artistic 
director remained in power even after the Soviet Union ceased to exist. While nearly 
everything else in the former Soviet Union had transformed dramatically almost overnight, 
Grigorovich endured. In a September 1992 interview, Plisetskaya had dramatically remarked, 
“at the moment, it’s impossible to work at the Bolshoi Theater because Sovetskaia vlast – 
Soviet power – is still in existence there. And there are no dancers, because there’s no 
repertoire. Just one dictator, like Stalin.”131  
 After a series of failed and embarrassing international tours, public criticism about the 
quality of artistic talent among dancers that was primarily blamed on Grigorovich, lingering 
tensions and factions in the company, and a redesign of the company’s contract system 
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Grigorovich resigned from his position in March 1995 at the age of sixty eight. Although his 
career as artistic director at the nation’s leading ballet theater had begun promisingly, 
Grigorovich’s tenure at the Bolshoi resulted in the artistic decline of the theater. Many of the 
creative and artistic debates that emerged under his leadership still remain points of 
contention among the dancers and artistic staff of the Bolshoi today, despite Grigorovich’s 
departure almost twenty years ago. The leadership at the country’s second ballet company, 
the Kirov Ballet in Leningrad, however, aimed to invigorate the artistic and creative life of 
Soviet ballet almost eight years before Gorbachev’s assent to power and has grappled with a 
different set of challenges.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vinogradov and the Kirov Ballet 
 
 
 Besides the return of formerly scorned ballet dancers, another homecoming to 
Leningrad in 1989 exemplifies the influence of glasnost in the ballet theaters. This journey, 
however, was not completed by a ballet artist, but by two pieces choreographed by George 
Balanchine. Many observers consider Balanchine, the founder of the New York City Ballet 
and the School of American Ballet, the greatest choreographer of the twentieth century. Born 
Giorgi Balanchivadze in St. Petersburg in 1904, Balanchine trained at the Imperial Ballet 
School and danced with the Mariinksy Ballet before fleeing the Soviet Union in 1924.132 In 
America he developed his own school of classical ballet technique that he infused into his 
innovative and modern choreography. Although celebrated throughout the world, 
Balanchine’s ballets, which differed immensely from the Russian heritage classics and Soviet 
ballets, had been performed in the Soviet Union only during New York City Ballet’s 1962 
tour. 
 Balanchine ballets typically lack a concrete story line, contain minimal costumes and 
sets, and draw from movement outside of the traditional academic ballet vocabulary. The 
characteristics that compose a Balanchine work therefore encompass many of the elements 
that had been most disdained by Soviet authorities. Ezrahi states that “the regime’s rejection 
of abstraction, modernism, and formalism reflected its fear of ambiguity and its desire for 
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control.” Balanchine ballets could offer a “dangerous scope for interpretation beyond the 
regime’s control.”133 Therefore, the first official staging of a Balanchine ballet by a Soviet 
company, which took place in February 1989 at the behest of the Kirov Ballet’s Artistic 
Director Oleg Vinogradov, constitutes such a significant event.134  
 While this event reflected the new possibilities facilitated by the Gorbachev era at the 
Kirov Theater, for example the overturning of the Stalinist policy of zhdanovshchina, 
Vinogradov had begun to innovate and reintegrate the ballet company with Western 
choreographers and encouraged the growth and development of Soviet choreographers 
almost a decade before Gorbachev assumed his role as general secretary of the Communist 
Party. Although Vinogradov’s attempts to modernize the Kirov Ballet during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s still encountered some difficulties and limitations they helped revamp a 
deteriorating company and illustrate an example of cultural ferment in Leningrad. The 
impetus to set Balanchine in Leningrad did not exist in a vacuum, but emerged from a strong 
desire to see Western influences in a Soviet institution.   
 Ten years younger than Grigorovich, Vinogradov had trained at the Leningrad 
Choreographic Institute and graduated in the same class as Nureyev. Prior to his appointment 
at the Kirov Ballet, Vinogradov had worked at the Novosibirsk State Opera and Ballet 
Theater and the Maly Ballet Theater in Leningrad. When the ballet master took command in 
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1977 of the Kirov Ballet, also comprised of over two hundred dancers, he inherited a ballet 
troupe in a state of crisis and stagnation. The troupe was still licking its wounds from the 
recent defections of talented dancers, recovering from the unexpected death of the star Yuri 
Solov’ev, and had presented only three premières since 1973, none of which proved 
successful or stayed in the theater’s repertoire.135 The company also continued to suffer from 
artistic losses to Moscow, which twelve years prior had included the transfer of Grigorovich 
from Leningrad to the capital. Ezrahi notes that “the Kirov Theater’s position was defined by 
the regime’s general suspicion of Leningrad and its determination to turn the Bolshoi into the 
premier company of the country, leading to a diversion of artistic talent from the Kirov to the 
Bolshoi.”136  
 Similar to other institutions during the later years of the Brezhnev era, the company 
desperately needed a systematic overhaul. Dancers of pensioner age constituted the majority 
of the artistic performers, the active repertoire comprised only ten ballets, and invitations to 
embark on tours from foreign impresarios arrived rarely.137 Vinogradov enthusiastically 
responded to the challenges of his new position, although many artists ridiculed his 
restructuring of the company. In addition to choreographing new works for the Kirov, 
Vinogradov also revitalized the corps de ballet, dismissed dancers of pensioner age, fired 
those who had been “stashed” at the theater yet continued to receive a salary.138 In his 
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autobiography, Vinogradov, who never joined the Party, notes that many theater employees 
clung to their Party memberships, not out of a conviction of communist ideals, but instead 
out of the desire to simply have a job and a position in life.139 
 During the late 1950s and early 1960s, despite the reallocating of artistic talent from 
the Kirov to the Bolshoi, Leningrad had emerged as the center for new choreography in the 
Soviet Union, building upon the city’s reputation, which harkened back to the Imperial era, 
as the country’s ballet capital.140 Ezrahi believes that the Kirov’s distance from Moscow 
contributed to the growth of choreographic innovation in Leningrad during this period.141 I 
assert that Vinogradov, aware of this history, desired to return the Kirov to its previous 
stature. Vinogradov sought to modernize the company’s repertoire by inviting Western 
choreographers to bring their creations to Leningrad already in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. In 1977 Vinogradov received permission to invite the French choreographer Roland 
Petit to stage his 1965 ballet The Hunched Back of Notre Dame. This constituted the first 
time a Western choreographer staged his own choreography for the Kirov Ballet and for 
Vinogradov, Petit’s trip became his first victory as artistic director. The ballet master’s 
dealings with cultural authorities to negotiate Petit’s journey to Leningrad, however, resulted 
in accusations being hurled at Vinogradov for being a sympathizer of formalism, modernism 
and pornography. In order to gain permission to bring Petit to the Soviet Union Vinogradov 
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enlisted the assistance of Leningrad Party members. Official permission for the French 
choreographer’s trip required a great deal of hassle and a degree of danger for those involved.  
 Petit’s 1978 Kirov production of The Hunched Back of Notre Dame resonated with 
audiences and stayed in the Kirov’s repertoire for many years. Vinogradov expressed 
particular satisfaction with the amount of artistic growth and development experienced by his 
dancers from their time working with Petit.142 Under Vinogradov’s auspices, the Kirov also 
presented two of Danish choreographer August Bourneville’s most famed works, La Sylphide 
and Napoli. Bourneville expert Elise Marianne von Rosen staged both productions. For 
dancers trained in the Soviet system of ballet technique,143 the Bourneville utilization of 
intricate footwork in petit allegro, fast, small jumps, posed a challenge.144 The Leningrad 
company also performed French choreographer Pierre Lacotte’s La Vivandiere and 
Papillon.145 
 Vinogradov recognized that in order to improve and mature as artists the Kirov 
dancers needed even more exposure to new and innovative choreography. He also hoped to 
prove that the Soviet method of training dancers prepared Soviet artists to dance not just the 
classics, but choreography of any style, even pieces that contained highly complicated and 
unusual movement outside of the academic ballet vocabulary.146 Vinogradov proved his 
                                                 
142
 Vinogradov, Ispoved’ baletmeistera, 233-34.  
 
143
 Often referred to as Vaganova technique, named after the famous Soviet pedagogue, Agripina 
Vaganova, who developed the training system in the 1920s and 30s.   
 
144
 Clement Crisp, “Affirming the Classics: The Kirov Ballet in Paris,” Dance Magazine 56, no. 10 
(1982): 70. 
 
145
 Reynolds “Staging Balanchine in Leningrad,” 49. 
 
146
 Vinogradov, Ispoved’ baletmeistera, 290. 
 
 50
commitment to the modernization of the company again when he met and invited another 
talented French choreographer, Maurice Bejart, to stage his works at the Kirov. Vinogradov 
proposed Bejart bring three of his works to Leningrad; Bakhti, a ballet set to national Indian 
music, Opus No. 5, and the adagio from the ballet Our Faust. Vinogradov again encountered 
difficulties when he requested Bejart’s company, Ballet of the 20th Century,147 visit 
Leningrad to perform. Before an official invitation could be issued, Vinogradov needed to 
convince the Minister of Culture Petr Demichev of the importance of the company’s visit, 
and enlisted the assistance of Vasiliev and Maksimova to appeal to Demichev. Demichev 
agreed to the visit of the foreign company, but under the condition that none of the ballets 
presented include sex or eroticism.148 Vinogradov promised to comply with the minister’s 
order, knowing full well that all of Bejart’s ballets contained elements of these forbidden 
themes. The Bejart performances in Leningrad were a resounding success, but because of 
their content, which included supposed “alien ideologies” Vinogradov feared a scandal 
would erupt.149 However, no such incident occurred; the two companies continued to benefit 
from the close relationship of their respective artistic directors.   
 Although the experiences at the Kirov with both Petit and Bejart proved successful 
and rewarding for the dancers, it is significant to note that the political views of both these 
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Western choreographers were sympathetic to the ideals of socialism.150 Their political 
ideologies certainly help explain why these particular choreographers were allowed to work 
with Soviet dancers when other foreign choreographers could only dream of this opportunity. 
Yet, despite the political inclinations of Bejart and Petit, their choreography still contained 
movement outside of the classroom ballet vocabulary that was utilized throughout the 
majority of the company’s repertoire. The two Frenchmen employed steps performed without 
utilizing turnout and movement in which the dancer’s back assumes a concave position.151 
The collaboration therefore provided the Kirov artists an opportunity their comrades at the 
Bolshoi would not have been able to experience without a fierce struggle against 
Grigorovich.  
 While cooperation with foreign choreographers benefited the Kirov dancers, 
Vinogradov also sought to cultivate the growth of young Soviet choreographers. In 1977 he 
allowed aspiring choreographer Dimitri Brantsev to stage a program entitled “Choreographic 
Novel,” which featured a series of short pieces set to the music of both modern and classical 
composers including Tchaikovsky, Sergei Prokofiev, Dmitri Shostakovich, and Elton John. 
Although Brantsev’s work does not compare to the genius of Balanchine or Bejart, 
Vinogradov’s willingness to allow choreographers other than himself to contribute to the 
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artistic life of the company stands in sharp contrast to how Grigorovich conducted affairs at 
the Bolshoi Theater.152 
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Where Is the Innovation? 
  
 
 “The Bolshoi should have had Balanchine years ago. But they waited for me to take 
the responsibility,”153 Vinogradov stated in a 1989 interview with a Moscow television host 
about incorporating Balanchine ballets into the Kirov repertoire. The Kirov held its première 
of Balanchine’s Themes and Variations and Scottish Symphony in late February 1989, but 
Vinogradov’s desire to bring Balanchine to Leningrad dated back even further. Journalist 
Nancy Reynolds, who traveled to Leningrad to document this historic première, notes that 
“Vinogradov has been on record at least since 1982 as favoring an entire evening of 
Balanchine ballets for the Kirov.”154 In September 1988, after reaching an agreement with 
Vinogradov, the Balanchine Trust sent two representatives, former New York City Ballet 
dancer Suzanne Farrell and former Pacific Northwest Ballet dancer Francia Russell, to teach 
the Kirov dancers Balanchine’s choreography.  
 In Leningrad, Farrell and Russell encountered dancers who knew little of Balanchine 
and struggled to master the demands of the choreography. When questioned about her 
knowledge of Balanchine, star dancer Altynai Asylmuratova responded, “I have seen very 
little of Balanchine’s work. He was here once in person, you know, but that was about a 
hundred years ago.”155 After several weeks of rehearsal principal dancer Konstantin 
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Zaklinksii stated, “Even now, when I dance the polonaise, my brain knows what I should do, 
but my legs can’t follow.”156 Despite these challenges, the performances proved successful, 
with Reynolds noticing only a few instances of dancers off their marks. The audience also 
responded enthusiastically with flowers, curtain calls, and cheers.  
 While the symbolic arrival of Balanchine in Leningrad (symbolic because the master 
choreographer had died in 1983) constitutes a remarkable feat and an indicator of changing 
times, this kind of spectacular event was rare during the perestroika period. Other artistic 
realms saw the proliferation of plays, poems, films, and novels that had been previously 
created for the “drawer,”157 but for the art of ballet, a performing art, the option of creating 
for the drawer had not been an option. An article in Sovetskii balet, the main ballet periodical 
in the Soviet Union, lamented the lack of new productions. In 1990 classical heritage ballets 
composed 50 percent of all performances, with Swan Lake and Giselle comprising nearly half 
of the shows.158 Just as it grew monotonous and unfulfilling for the dancers to perform in the 
same productions over and over, so it also grew unexciting for the audience to sit through the 
same shows repeatedly.  
 The audience was not always guaranteed a high quality performance. Although the 
advertisement posted outside of the theater might promote a full production of The Sleeping 
Beauty, due to the high frequency of touring the companies did not always have the 
resources, including both manpower and finances, to present full productions and therefore, 
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started performing excerpts from ballets.159 If the theaters could barley present the staples of 
their own repertoire how could they be expected to produce new creative works?  
  The creation of the Association for the Activities of Choreographic Art of the USSR 
in the late 1980s attempted to address the dearth of new and modern choreography in the 
Soviet Union. Organized within the framework of the All Union Music Community, the 
association sought to develop and answer questions regarding what constituted modern 
choreographic art, preserve and propagandize the classical heritage, and address questions of 
pedagogy, dance education, and legal issues.160 Sovetskii balet published the organization’s 
charter in its March-April 1990 issue thereby communicating the association’s goals to the 
Soviet ballet community. Despite the stated efforts of the group, little evidence of the 
organization’s influence found reflection at the Bolshoi or the Kirov.  
 Another Sovetskii balet article complained about the lack of exposure to the 
international dance scene, despite the increased global movement that dancers enjoyed during 
the Gorbachev era.161 The editorial by Soviet ballet expert V. Ural’skaia applauded the 
increase of foreign companies invited to perform on Soviet soil, but criticized the caliber of 
these companies and the fact that the majority of these performances occurred only in 
Moscow. The author desired to see the New York City Ballet and Martha Graham’s modern 
dance company invited to perform. Ural’skaia stressed the importance of Soviet dancers and 
choreographers attending international dance festivals abroad. She asserted that attendance at 
festivals would not only expose Soviet artists to other forms of choreography, but also assist 
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in keeping an interested audience, both at home and on foreign soil. The author attributed 
Soviet artists’ lack of participation in foreign festivals to a lack of financial resources, but 
expressed hope that associations in the emerging private sector would be able to help.  
 One such group, the newly formed nonprofit organization called simply the Russian 
Ballet Fund, held a benefit performance in mid-1991 to raise money for the organization’s 
activities. The performance consisted primarily of Grigorovich’s ballets. Founded by 
admirers of classical ballet and members of the Bolshoi Theater collective, the charity sought 
to help support ballet artists. Publicized in Sovetskii balet, the group asked for contributions 
from balletomanes that loved the Bolshoi Theater and the traditions of the Soviet ballet 
school, which they asserted would help in the noble cause of raising the culture of the Soviet 
people.162 It is significant that even during economic hardships people valued the traditions 
of the ballet enough to ensure its survival. Funds raised by the group could have helped 
rectify some of the criticisms vocalized by ballet critics and experts in Sovetskii balet. 
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Conclusion  
  
 
 “I remained in the West because I did not want to die an early death as a ballerina in 
the Kirov’s routine, which nothing was going to change.”163 Speaking in the late 1970s, 
Makarova, had not witnessed nor heard of the innovation occurring at her former home 
institution before perestroika and glasnost brought significant change to the Soviet system. 
Certainly, had she remained in the Soviet Union, the artistic opportunities available to her 
would have been drastically smaller than what she experienced in the West, but that does not 
mean that the stirrings of artistic ferment were completely absent. By examining the actions 
of the Bolshoi and the Kirov during the late Soviet period this study has opened a fortochka 
or window into the reevaluation of the trope of Brezhnevite stagnation.  
 The reforms associated with the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union lifted the seemingly perennial 
Iron Curtain for Soviet artists performing on the two most prestigious stages in the country. 
Although both the Bolshoi and the Kirov had embarked on international tours to Western 
Europe and North America beginning in the late 1950s, and sporadically throughout the 
following decades, the newfound ability to easily grand jéte across borders allowed the 
troupes to increase their rate of international touring, facilitated the homecoming of 
previously scorned defectors, and enabled individual dancers the opportunity to guest star 
with foreign companies without generating scandal and backlash at home. The tours provided 
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financial support to the ballet theaters, state sponsored institutions desperately in need of hard 
currency. In addition to offering monetary benefits to the dancers, guest artist contracts also 
cultivated long-awaited opportunities for substantial artistic growth. 
 International mobility allowed some ballet artists to realize fully the artistic potential 
they had tried to cultivate at home and ensured that highly publicized defection scandals 
would remain a relic from another era. In Moscow under the dictatorial reign of Grigorovich, 
artists at the Bolshoi Ballet longed for new works to progress and develop their craft. Many 
who fought against Grigorovich’s rule eventually found creative and artistic fulfillment on 
foreign stages, but lost their places at the Bolshoi in the process. The Kirov Ballet had begun 
to experience choreographic modernization beginning in the late 1970s through collaboration 
with Western choreographers. Even though these choreographic artists were sympathetic to 
the ideals of socialism, the work they brought to Leningrad represented a stark stylistic 
departure from the typical ballets of the Kirov repertoire. These choreographic trends 
illustrate that the cultural lives of the Kirov and Bolshoi Ballet parallels the ferment 
occurring among other artistic groups and members of the intelligentsia in the years before 
Gorbachev. 
 Yet, despite the desire for innovation and greater creative freedom at the Kirov 
through artistic leadership, and at the Bolshoi, through the dancers, before the turning point 
of 1985, during Gorbachev’s tenure, the desire for new collaborations and modern creative 
works exhibited earlier were not completely fulfilled. The repertoire of the nation’s leading 
ballet companies continued to consist of the expected ballets, with noteworthy premiers, such 
as the Kirov’s presentation of Balanchine’s Themes and Variations and Scottish Symphony 
occurring rarely. Although more than twenty years have transpired since the demise of the 
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Soviet system, the questions that the Gorbachev era forced the ballet theaters to confront 
remain unanswered and the problems and tensions inherited by the Bolshoi from Grigorovich 
remain entrenched in the culture of the theater. 
 The artistic debates and infighting at the Bolshoi today, which so tragically and 
violently spilled outside of the theater in the form of an acid attack, illustrates that the 
conflicts of Grigorovich’s tenure are still alive and more public than ever before. The cultural 
ferment that existed before perestroika has not yielded; it appears to have grown, and 
continues to exist today.  Before the Bolshoi Ballet can begin its next act it must discover a 
way to reconcile the forces of innovation and tradition.  
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